3 Reasons the Democratic Tsunami Might Not Be Coming

A tsunami is an unstoppable wall of water. By the time you see it coming, everything in its path is already in danger.

That is the image some political commentators are now using to describe the Democratic Party's prospects in November.

Newsweek recently published an article examining three signs that a Democratic tsunami could be approaching and one reason it might not.

But there is a problem with that narrative.

The national polling headlines and what is happening in individual states are not telling exactly the same story.

I am not suggesting Democrats have no momentum. They do. Pew Research Center's October survey gives Democrats an eight-point national advantage in congressional preferences, and 63% of Democratic candidate supporters describe themselves as extremely motivated to vote, compared with 46% of Republican supporters.

Those are meaningful numbers.

But I believe there are three compelling reasons to question whether that advantage will translate into the enormous electoral sweep some headlines are encouraging Americans to expect.

1. New York Is Revealing Something the National Narrative Misses

Let's begin with New York, a state that has been governed by Democrats for years and where Republicans face an enormous voter-registration disadvantage.

Republican Bruce Blakeman is challenging incumbent Governor Kathy Hochul.

Earlier surveys showed Hochul ahead by double digits. Emerson College placed her at 52% against Blakeman's 40%.

Then something interesting appeared.

An October 8–12 Pollfinity survey showed Hochul receiving 47% against Blakeman's 44% in the full ballot test. In a hypothetical head-to-head matchup, the difference narrowed to 48%–47%.

One percentage point.

The survey has a margin of error of 4.8 points and a relatively small sample of 499 respondents. Other major polls still give Hochul a substantially larger lead, so that one-point result cannot establish that the entire race has shifted.

But look underneath the topline.

The same survey found 58% of unaffiliated voters supporting Blakeman, compared with 28% for Hochul. An earlier Emerson survey also found Blakeman leading among independents, 55%–34%.

That is the part I find particularly interesting.

An independent voter supporting a Republican in New York is not necessarily joining the Republican Party. That voter may simply be dissatisfied with taxes, housing costs, government spending, or the direction of the state.

Political dissatisfaction can cross party lines.

For me, the important question is whether political analysts are paying enough attention to these voters when describing the country as preparing for an overwhelming Democratic victory.

New York's gubernatorial election does not determine congressional control, but it offers a valuable reminder: national party sentiment and individual state contests can move differently.

2. Texas Is Not Following the Supposed Tsunami

Now let's go to Texas.

The newest Marist Poll, released October 14, reveals a development that deserves considerably more attention.

Among likely Texas voters, 51% support Republican congressional candidates, compared with 46% supporting Democrats.

Even more revealing, the Republican advantage among registered voters has changed from a three-point Democratic lead in September to a three-point Republican lead in October.

That is a six-point shift in the congressional preference margin.

Republican Governor Greg Abbott also leads Democrat Gina Hinojosa 49%–45% among likely voters.

Meanwhile, the Senate contest between Ken Paxton and James Talarico remains much closer, with Talarico receiving 47% against Paxton's 45% in the Marist survey.

Think about what those numbers tell us.

The same electorate can lean Republican for Congress, favor a Republican governor, and evaluate an individual Senate candidate differently.

That is not the picture of a uniform movement sweeping away every Republican candidate.

It is the picture of voters making distinctions among candidates, policies, and offices.

And remember something else.

Donald Trump carried Texas by nearly 14 percentage points in 2024.

That advantage does not automatically transfer to every Republican candidate in 2026. But neither should it disappear from political analysis merely because several polls show close Senate contests.

A competitive Senate race is not the same thing as an entire state abandoning its political identity.

There is a deeper issue here.

Voters are not simply choosing personalities. They are also evaluating the governing programs those candidates could help advance.

Border enforcement, domestic energy production, taxation, parental authority, judicial appointments, and the future of American manufacturing all depend, in different ways, on who controls Washington.

As someone who builds businesses and technology systems, I look at politics partly through the question of implementation.

A president can announce an ambitious economic agenda. But turning that agenda into durable policy frequently requires legislation, funding, regulatory decisions, and congressional cooperation.

That makes the composition of Congress a consequential question extending far beyond Donald Trump's personality or any single campaign controversy.

3. Pollsters Have Underestimated Republicans Before. Why Ignore That History?

Here is where my skepticism becomes stronger.

In 2016, Donald Trump won the Electoral College despite widespread expectations of a Hillary Clinton victory.

In 2020, national and state polling substantially overestimated Joe Biden's eventual margins.

And in 2024, the American Association for Public Opinion Research found that public polling once again underestimated Republican support relative to Democrats.

To be precise, the 2024 polls were considerably more accurate overall than those in 2016 and 2020. They correctly portrayed a close presidential contest.

But the direction of the remaining error is worth studying.

Across three presidential elections, pollsters repeatedly encountered difficulties measuring the full extent of Republican support.

One explanation involves nonresponse bias: certain voters may be less willing to participate in political surveys than others.

Another involves turnout models.

Pollsters can contact registered voters and ask which candidates they support. But determining which of those people will actually participate on Election Day requires additional assumptions.

That distinction matters.

A registered voter, a likely voter, and an actual voter are not interchangeable.

And when a close election is decided by two or three percentage points, small differences in turnout assumptions can have substantial consequences.

Does that mean every Democratic polling lead is secretly a Republican advantage?

No. That would be an equally unsupported conclusion. Midterm polls have sometimes performed better than presidential polls, and there is no guarantee past errors will repeat in the same direction.

But it does mean that presenting an uncertain polling environment as an approaching political catastrophe—or triumph—can create a distorted impression of what the data actually establish.

Polls are instruments for measuring public opinion. They are not certified election results.

This Election Is Bigger Than a Wave

There is one more element I believe national political analysis frequently overlooks.

America is entering a period of extraordinary economic and technological competition.

China is expanding artificial intelligence infrastructure, developing advanced manufacturing capacity, and investing enormous resources in energy and industrial systems.

The United States is responding through private investment in data centers, semiconductor manufacturing, domestic energy, aerospace, and emerging technologies.

Those decisions affect jobs, wages, national security, and the ability of American entrepreneurs to build the next generation of companies.

Meanwhile, voters are also confronting major questions involving immigration, healthcare, parental rights, education, taxation, and religious liberty.

Democrats and Republicans offer different approaches to these challenges, and those disagreements deserve serious examination.

In my view, the Republican argument for domestic energy expansion, entrepreneurship, industrial investment, and a more limited federal government deserves far more attention than the endless political theater surrounding individual personalities.

But whichever policies Americans prefer, one principle should remain clear.

The country cannot determine its future through polling headlines.

A Democratic advantage in national surveys deserves attention. So does a measurable Republican improvement in Texas, independent-voter support for Blakeman in New York, and the historical difficulties pollsters have encountered when measuring Republican participation.

The evidence does not establish that a Democratic tsunami is coming. It establishes that Democrats have important advantages, Republicans retain areas of strength, and the actual size of any electoral shift remains undecided.

I refuse to confuse a forecast with a result.

Because political power is not determined by who produces the most dramatic headline three weeks before an election.

It is determined by the American people.

They can predict a blue tsunami. They can redraw the maps. They can declare momentum. But until November 3, not one of those predictions is a victory.

And in a constitutional republic, the final word belongs to the voters—not the pollsters.